Prelude to Intervention: The Decision of the United States and Japan to Intervene In Siberia, 1917-1918

By Daniel A. Leifheit

“Whether Japan and the United States can establish friendly relations or not will almost determine our country’s fate…”[1] These prophetic words were spoken by Hara Takashi, leader of Japan’s majority party, the Siyukai, and a member of the Japanese Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, while his government discussed its stance on an invitation from the United States to intervene in Siberia. At the end of World War I, Allied forces consisting of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, converged on a cold and unforgiving region in the Far East.  Their aims differed in many ways, but they were all held together by an Alliance. This is the story of diplomatic relations, occurring from November 1917 to August 1918, that led up to the intervention between the two nations committing the most soldiers, the United States and Japan. The significance of this story is that the Japanese had from the very moment of the Bolshevik takeover in Russia endeavored to use the crisis in Siberia to their advantage. Their goal was to increase their position among the world powers by sending the most troops to assure that they would have supreme command over any Allied operation in Siberia.

Questions include, why did the United States and Japan chose to send soldiers to Siberia? Another question is whether either of the two countries distrusted the other during the intervention. Also to be answered is how intervention in Siberia was viewed by the Japanese and the Americans.

     The main questions to be answered are how the Japanese government was able to keep open the option of sending  large reinforcements and why the United States allowed this when Japan had agreed originally to send only 12,000 troops or one division to Vladivostok to protect the Czecho-Slovak legion. This question is important in understanding how the situation with Japanese troops got so out of hand with numbers reaching over 70,000.

     The area of Siberia that is in question ranges from Lake Baikal in the west to Vladivostok in the east. Connecting these locations is the eastern portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the world’s longest railroad stretching from Europe to the Sea of Japan. The Trans-Siberian Railway became the strategic artery in Siberia, carrying troops, supplies and medical help. Sections of this railway were divided between the different nations for protection.

     Headquarters for the Allied intervention was at the port of Vladivostok in southern Siberia near the Korean border. This is the city where troops, supplies, and munitions poured into Siberia for use in the intervention. In the harbor were millions of tons of supplies that had been given to the Russians by the Allies to support military actions on the eastern front. When the Czar fell from power and the Bolsheviks took the Russians out of World War I, these supplies were left to sit in the harbor. Preventing these supplies from falling into the wrong hands became a top priority for the Allies, increasing Vladivostok’s importance.

     During the planning phase of the intervention, the figurehead of the Japanese Government was the Emperor Taisho. The government of Japan was a constitutional monarchy, although an imperfect one. This was because the Meiji Constitution, written after the end of the Tokagawa period, did not specify that the civilian government had control over the military. This flaw in the constitution was beginning to make itself felt around this time since many of the senior Meiji officials were no longer in power due to death or retirement.

 The Japanese premiere was Terachi Masatake; he was also the head of the Choshu clique.  Terachi’s cabinet contained many members who would be instrumental in the decision to intervene in Siberia. Among them was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Goto Shimpei, who held the post from April through September 1918. Among the key military planners was the Army Chief of Staff, Uehara Yusaku, as well as the Vice Chief of Staff, Tanaka Gi’ichi. The War Minister was General Oshima Ken’ichi and the Navy Minister was Admiral Baron Kato Tomosciburo. The Japanese ambassador in Washington was Viscount Ishii Kikujiro.[2] 

In the United States at this time, the Executive Branch of the government was under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson. Among the figures in his cabinet who would become key in this planning phase was the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing. The Secretary of War was Newton D. Baker and the Secretary of the Navy was Josephus Daniels. William McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury, was another member of Wilson’s Cabinet. The American ambassador in Japan was Roland Morris.[3]

Siberia was important to Japan for a number of reasons. One of the reasons was that the Japanese wanted to create an independent Siberian state headed by a puppet regime loyal to the Japanese. This, they believed, would help in the defense of Japan if any power attacked from eastern Russia. The stability of Siberia also was important for developing Japanese interests in the region. Economics also played a factor in Siberia. Japan, lacking many natural resources, wanted to procure minerals and timber from the region. They also wanted to maintain the Siberian market for their goods. Siberia was the third largest consumer of Japanese products.[4]

The United States, on the other hand, had differing goals in mind for Siberia. The United States’ main objective was to maintain Siberian Russia’s right to self determination in choosing their form of government. The United States was also interested in spreading capitalism to the region. The reason for this was increasing the market for U.S. goods in Asia.[5]

As early as mid-November 1917, after the Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia, the General Staff of the Japanese Army had drawn up plans for an intervention in Siberia. Details of this plan included why troops should be sent, how many troops should be sent, how the command of the expedition should be set up, as well as the details of the movement of troops. The justification given in this original plan was to protect Japanese citizens in North Manchuria and the Maritime Territory of Siberia. Another goal was to provide for military expeditions that might become necessary at a future date.[6]

The number of troops Japan would be sending was based on the number of Japanese citizens residing in North Manchuria and the Maritime Territory of Siberia. Other reasons included establishing troops in the region and positioning themselves in the supreme command if there was any inter-Allied intervention in the future. This shines light on Japanese intent from the earliest discussions on the proposed military actions, was to use an intervention in Siberia to increase their standing as a world power.[7]

The command structure of the Japanese expeditionary forces was also discussed. This stated who would have command over the different areas of control in the region during the intervention. The two bodies that would control the region were the Kwantung Government General and the Maritime Territory Temporary Detachment Headquarters. Troops for the Kwantung Government General would come from Korea and Japan and would protect Japanese citizens in Northwest Manchuria. The Maritime Territory Temporary Detachment Headquarters on the other hand would derive their troops solely from Japan and protect areas in Northeast Manchuria and the Maritime Province of Siberia. This shows that the Japanese were planning for a large scale intervention from the beginning of the Siberian crisis.[8]

In this original plan, the Maritime Territory Temporary Detachment would be centered in Vladivostok. They were also responsible for protecting communications infrastructure such as telegraph lines and facilities. The Kwantung Government General’s troops would be centered at Harbin in North Manchuria. These soldiers were to protect the telegraph and railroad infrastructure. The war minister would be in charge of supplying these troops after conferring with the army chief of staff.[9]

At the end of December 1917, the United States and Japan agreed that sending troops into Siberia would have the effect of turning the whole of Russia towards the side of the Bolsheviks as the result of a perceived imperialist threat. Both countries had been asked by the Allied powers to intervene but concluded that it was not the right time for such an action.[10]

On January 8, 1918, the French ambassador to the United States, Jean Jusserand, conveyed his country’s proposals for intervening in Siberia. The purposes of an allied force were to protect Siberia from hostile influences, secure the various railways, including the Trans-Siberian, and protect the supplies that had accumulated in Vladivostok for Imperial Russia’s war time use. This proposal is an early example of ideas that the Americans would adopt in their own plan in July.[11]

On January 10, the Russians expressed concern that the Japanese were planning to occupy Siberia. This is important because the Russians were in contact with the Americans from the beginning of the discussions on the intervention. It is also important that the Russians held the same concerns about Japan as the United States did. In response to the Russian concern, a joint force of the Allies was suggested by the United States ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, to help prevent this from happening. Francis also requested warships in the port of Vladivostok to protect the city. The Russians desired to have these warships under the command of an American officer.[12]

Japanese unilateralism was expressed in mid-January when Japan requested to undertake an occupation of various railways in Siberia alone. They also desired sole control of the port of Vladivostok, although Allied warships were still necessary to protect the city’s harbor. They were pleased that the United States government had declined proposals for a joint expedition.[13]

The Japanese Army General Staff already had new plans for intervention by the end of January. Along with protecting Japanese citizens, they were to suppress enemy forces in the region, including Bolsheviks. Many of the same ideas that were present in the November statement, such as protecting lines of communication, were still included in this proposal. The most intriguing statement made by the Japanese in this plan was that it would “secretly make the necessary preparations for operations against Russia, which may be expected to develop in the future; and, depending on circumstances, will confiscate railroad rolling stock.[14]

In February, the Japanese also proposed sending troops to the Trans-Baikal area of Siberia. Their purpose would be “to aid Cossack troops in the vicinity of Chita, to sweep aside the Bolsheviks in Trans-Baikal Territory, and to protect the residents of the Territory who have moderate ideas; in short, to assist their independence.”[15] This plan also targeted the German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war who had taken up arms in Siberia. It was a clear indication that the Japanese had plans for a large scale involvement in regions other than the Maritime Territory.[16]

At the end of February, the Japanese invited the Chinese government to join Japan in an expedition to restore order to Siberia. China then requested the United States’ advice on this matter. The United States replied that if “Japan deemed military occupation a necessity, for the Chinese Government to take over and guard that portion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad system which passes through Manchuria”.[17]

In March, one of the senior leaders of the Bolshevik movement, Leon Trotsky, requested that American troops be sent to help maintain order. His arguments for this were that he believed Japan had “taken steps in Vladivostok and Siberia to seize and control railroad and territory or is about to take such action, either in understanding with Germany or with some of the Allies.”[18] This request for an American intervention in Siberia is important in that someone in the upper echelons of the Soviet movement had invited the United States to send troops into Russian territory.[19]

The Japanese issued a comparative analysis in March on how their troops would stack up against hostile forces in Siberia. In the Maritime Territory they expected 14,000 enemy combatants. These included 5,000 German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war and 9,000 Bolsheviks. The Japanese were planning to send approximately 19,000 troops to this region. In the Trans-Baikal Territory, the Japanese expected to be up against a force of 103,000 men. These included 93,000 German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war and 10,000 Bolsheviks. The Japanese planned to send in 51,000 of their own troops as well as 10,000 Chinese troops. The Japanese believed that they would overcome numerical odds since their troops were better trained. The 70,000 troops that Japan had planned to send turned out to be the number they would send when the Allied intervention finally did occur.[20]

On March 5, the United States issued a statement to Japan that questioned the need for an intervention. The U.S. made it clear that if Japan intervened in Siberia, the Japanese had to do it for the interest of Russia, not that of Japan. This telegram conveyed the concern that the Japanese would do the same thing in Siberia that the Germans did in invading European Russia. It was feared that if the United States intervened in Siberia they would also be accused of invading Russia.[21]

On March 20, the United States sent a telegram to the Japanese to ease concerns that the Americans were rejecting an intervention in Siberia based on questionable motives that compelled Japan to send troops. The U.S. reported to Japan that an intervention would be bad for Russia and beneficial to the Germans. The report also stated that there was insufficient evidence to support an intervention.[22]

In early April, Japan’s Foreign Minister expressed his belief that the Japanese should improve their position among the world powers by intervening in Siberia. This he believed would give Japan more leverage at the peace conference when the war finally ended. He wanted the intervention to be viewed by the Allies as a part of the war against the Germans.[23] Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok on April 5, citing the excuse of the killing of three Japanese nationals by Russians in Vladivostok the day before. Japan’s stated reason for the landing of troops was to “protect life and property of Japanese.”[24]

May, 1918, brought a new alliance between Japan and China. The Sino-Japanese Joint Defensive Military Agreement was meant to strengthen the two countries in their fight against hostile elements in Russia. They were to assist each other in any way possible to ensure the defeat of their mutual enemies. This alliance gave Japan more firepower when Japan, America and the other Allies began the intervention in August.[25]

On June 5, the United States’ minister in China, Paul S. Reinsch, sent a telegram to Secretary of State Lansing reporting that Russian general Gregory Semenov, who was in charge of Cossacks in the Far East, was expecting the Japanese Army to send two battalions of soldiers to provide “unofficial assistance.” These troops were to help Semenov fight the Bolsheviks. Japan had agreed to supply Semenov with these two battalions in exchange for economic incentives such as exclusive raw material rights in the region. Reinsch went further by saying that Allied intervention in Siberia was necessary to control German influence in the area. He said it was possible to use the forces of the Czecho-Slovak troops. He also suggested that 10,000 American troops be sent to Siberia to support the military action once it occurred.[26]

The United States Ambassador to Japan, Roland Morris, sent Secretary of State Lansing a telegram on June 7 reporting on the current discussions in Japan between the allies concerning possible military action in Siberia. He reported that the Allied governments had not yet requested that the Japanese join in intervention given the reluctance of the Americans to get involved. The Japanese were asked by the Allied governments to possibly go it alone in Siberia if the situation got too out of hand and the Americans still did not desire to send troops. Morris ended his telegram by reporting that “Semenov’s success was short lived and his movement appears to be disintegrating.”[27] Semenov’s forces had reportedly been defeated by June 19.[28]

The Supreme War Council submitted a telegram to Secretary of State Lansing on June 10 reporting that the Allied powers wanted Japan to intervene in Siberia. The council also stated the conditions for a Japanese military action. These three conditions, put forth by the Supreme War Council, were “that Japan should promise to respect the territorial integrity of Russia; that she would take no side in the international politics of the country; that she would advance as far west as possible for the purpose of encountering the Germans.”[29] These conditions were also to apply to all the Allied powers when intervention occurred.[30]

The views of the United States around June 22 concerning Japan were quite naďve. The American ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, stated that “we have no fear concerning her exactions or demands when the war ends. War will certainly terminate in our favor.”[31] He continued by stating that “the Entente will dominate the peace table and Japan will be compelled to accept the just terms offered whether she likes them or not.”[32] He further professed that Japan would not object to the self-determination of people because the Japanese could not afford to. This is important because it shows that the Allied powers were already suspicious of Japan’s motives for intervening in Siberia.[33]

On June 27 there was a proposal by the French for the use of troops in Siberia. In this report, an economic department was proposed to be headed by the Americans. It was also suggested that Japanese and Czecho-Slovak forces be used as the spearhead for attacks in Siberia. The soldiers of the United States, Great Britain, and France were to be used for garrison duty and public relations. This report recognized that Japan would need to be in command of the overall operation since the Japanese would be sending the greatest number of troops. It also made room for civilian control over military action by means of an Allied commission that was to be headed by an American.[34]

July 1918 was the busiest month in the ongoing negotiations between the Allied governments, especially the United States and Japan. During this month the Supreme War Council, an organization of the Allied powers created to dictate war policy, delivered its proposals to the United States concerning the looming intervention. After submitting their statements, the United States invited Japan to join in the intervention. Japan studied the United States’ invitation and decided on their stance. July was also the month that President Woodrow Wilson issued his Aide Memoire. This was to become the only defined orders that the general in charge of the American troops would receive for the intervention.[35]

On the morning of July 3, 1918 a telegram from the Supreme War Council was delivered to Secretary of State Robert Lansing. In this telegram the Supreme War Council outlined its proposal for an Allied intervention in Russia and Siberia. They stated that the reasons for intervention were first "to bring assistance to the Czecho-Slovak forces which have made great sacrifices to the cause for which we are fighting."[36] By the summer of 1918 around fifty thousand soldiers of the Czecho-Slovak Army were in Siberia after making their way through Russia into Siberia. They were stuck there and the Supreme War Council wanted to get them back to Europe so they could utilize the Czecho-Slovak Army on the western front. The Supreme War Council suggested that there would be little resistance from the local population because "the success of the Czecho-Slovak troops proves that the bulk of the Siberian population are no longer sympathetic to the Bolsheviks and must be friendly disposed to the Allied cause."[37]

Secondly the Supreme War Council argued that intervention in Russia and Siberia "is urgently necessary in order to save Russia from the establishment of autocracy supported by German bayonets." Its members believed at the time that there was a German-Bolshevik conspiracy in the works. They said that the Bolsheviks have been unable to form an effective army giving them "no real power with which to support their rule." The telegram asserted further that "the best liberal and democratic elements in Russia are beginning to lift their heads and to get into touch with one another." If the Germans were to intervene first, the Allies believed that no democracy would develop in Russia. As a result, Siberia became an area of great importance so that the Germans would not "close the last means of contact between Russia and the outside world." The Allies also aimed "to deny to Germany the supplies of western Siberia and the important military stores at Vladivostok…"[38]

Thirdly, the Supreme War Council suggested that “Allied intervention is essential in order to win the war." The Allies wanted to be able to open up an Allied eastern front so that more German troops would be forced to move from the western front to fight in the east. If such a front were to be achieved, they believed it would weaken Germany’s defenses in a way that would "win the war in 1919."[39]

The Supreme War Council ended by saying that that "the Japanese have now agreed to send an expedition into Siberia provided they are assured of the approval and active support of the United States Government." The addition of troops from the United States would create an intervention of an Allied nature, which the Supreme War Council desired, not an image of a unilateral action by just the Japanese. One hundred thousand troops were needed, according to the council’s recommendation, most of which would come from Japan. This number was to ensure that the situation in Siberia would be brought under control and that intervention would be a success.[40]

     In response to the July 3 appeal by the Supreme War Council for an intervention in Siberia, the White House convened a conference on July 6 to discuss the situation. Attending the conference were President Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, General March, and Admiral Benson.  During this conference, four propositions were decided upon. The first of these proposals stated “that the establishment of an eastern front through a military expedition, even if it was wise to employ a large Japanese force, is physically impossible though the front was established east of the Ural Mountains”.[41] The rejection of the idea of a new eastern front struck a blow to one of the main points of the Supreme War Council’s appeal. The point that was made by the council was that a new front was needed in the east to lessen the German presence on the western front, making an Allied victory more achievable. This rejection was also reflected in the second point which asserted that advancing beyond the city of Irkutsk to the west was not possible.[42]

     The Supreme War Council was successful in their appeal about the plight of the Czecho-Slovak army in Siberia. The United States agreed “that the present situation of the Czecho-Slovaks requires this Government and the other governments to make an effort to aid those at Vladivostok in forming a junction with their compatriots in western Siberia.”[43] The way to achieve this aim in the short term was stated in the fourth proposal. This provided for the rearmament of the Czecho-Slovak forces by the Japanese. The costs of the weaponry were to be shared by all participating governments. It also proposed a small force of roughly 7,000 troops each from the United States and Japan. This limited approach was intended to secure the port of Vladivostok and assist the Czecho-Slovaks. Further steps were to be taken when they were needed.[44]

The proposals that were put forth at the White House conference of July 6 were delivered to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Ishii Kikujiro, by Secretary of State Robert Lansing on July 8. After reviewing the objectives that the United States had suggested for an intervention, Ishii told Lansing that he agreed with the plan and would submit a copy of it to the Japanese government.[45]

After receiving the United States’ proposed terms for an intervention in Siberia, the Japanese discussed it thoroughly. On July 11, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army released his views on the American proposal. In this statement he suggested first of all that all options for the intervention should be strategic. By strategic he meant that Japan should use an intervention in Siberia to secure economic influence in the region and control the area’s rich natural resources. He also stated that it was unwise to put a limitation on troop numbers before the situation in Siberia could be assessed with troops on the ground.[46]

The Japanese Army’s decision on the size of its forces and how they were to be organized came on July 12. They decided to exploit the American proposal and send one division to Siberia as precursor to a large-scale intervention. The Army decided that the 12^th division would be the first sent to Siberia. The Army again stated its desire to have supreme command over any Allied intervention. The Army’s decision also hinted at a wider intervention than the Americans had proposed by stating that a force to the Trans-Baikal Territory would be suggested in the future.[47]

While waiting for the Japanese reply to the proposals of the White House conference, President Woodrow Wilson issued the Aide Memoire of July 17. Much of this statement differed from what the other western allies had proposed. Wilson did not believe that intervention in Russia would aid in the fight against Germany. He stated that "it is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany."[48]

Wilson agreed that intervention was admissible "only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance." He did not commit U.S. troops to stop the Bolsheviks. He assured the Russians that none of the governments involved "contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia" or "any intervention in her internal affairs."[49]

American troops were only to guard the military stores, help the Russians in forming their own means of self-defense, and help the Czecho-Slovak forces to return home. President Wilson afforded the troops an escape clause in his Aide Memoire when he stated that if United States "shall feel obliged to withdraw these forces, in order to add them to the western front," it would. Major General William S. Graves, commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, used this Aide Memoire as the blue print for operations throughout the nineteen months of the American involvement in the Siberian intervention, and never once got involved in Russia’s internal affairs.[50]

The binding decision of Japanese Premier Terauchi Masatake, War Minister Oshima Ken’ichi, and Vice Chief of Staff Tanaka Gi’ichi came on July 20. The proposals in this declaration were to be delivered in a public statement to the United States. Political reasons for sending an advance body of troops before the arrival of the 12^th Division, such as obtaining better positioning at the future peace conference, were abandoned. The goal of having supreme command over the other allies was reemphasized. The mobilization of two divisions was ordered for duty in Siberia. These were the 3^rd and 12^th Divisions. The 7^th Division and the 40^th Infantry Brigade were also activated to protect the 3^rd division. The 12^th Division’s duty would be to protect the Czecho-Slovak troops in Vladivostok. The only thing that was left out of Japan’s public statement was their desire for supreme command of the intervention. This was to lessen allied suspicion of Japan.[51]