66TH CONGRESS, ~                                              SENATE                                                                                              DOCUMENT

1st Session. ~                                                                                                                                                      &nb! sp;                                                             No. 60.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN SIBERIA.

 

MESSAGE

FROM THE

 

 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE AGREED TO JUNE

23, 1919, INFORMING THE SENATE OF THE REASONS FOR

SENDING UNITED STATES SOLDIERS TO AND MAINTAINING

THEM IN SIBERIA.

 

                                                                                        June 25, 1919.—Read; ordered to be printed and lie on the table.

 

 

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, July 22, 1919.

The PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE.

 

Sir: For the information of the Senate, and in response to the resolution adopted June 23, 1919, requesting the President to inform the Senate, if not incompatible with the public interest, of the reasons for sending United States soldiers to Siberia, the duties that are to be performed by these soldiers, how long they are to remain, and generally to advise the Senate of the policy of the United States Government in respect to Siberia and the maintenance of United States soldiers there, I have the honor to say that the decision to send American troops to Siberia was announced to the press on August 5, 1918, in a statement from the Acting Secretary of State, of which a copy is enclosed.

This measure was taken in conjunction with Japan and in concert of purpose with the other allied powers, first of all to save the CzechoSlovak armies which were threatened with destruction by hostile armies apparently organized by, and often largely composed of enemy prisoners of war. The second purpose in view was to steady any efforts of the Russians at self-defense, or the establishment of law and order in which they might be willing to accept assistance.

Two regiments of Infantry, with auxiliary troops—about 8,000 effectives—-comprising a total of approximately 10,000 men, were sent under the command of Maj. Gen. William S. Graves. The troops began to arrive at Vladivostok in September, 1918. Considerably larger forces were dispatched by Japan at about the same time and much smaller forces by others of the allied powers. The net result was the successful reunion of the separated CzechoSlovak armies, and the substantial elimination in eastern Siberia of the active efforts of enemy prisoners of war. A period of relative quiet then ensued.

In February, 1919, as a conclusion of negotiations begun earl in the summer of l918, the United States accepted a plan proposed by Japan for the supervision of the Siberian railways by an International committee, under which committee Mr. John F. Stevens would assume the operation of the Russian Railway Service Corps. In this connection, it is to be recalled that Mr. John F. Stevens, in response to a request of the provisional government of Russia, went to Russia in the spring of 1917. A few months later he was made official adviser to the minister of ways of communication at Petrograd under the provisional government. At the request of the provisional government, and with the support of Mr. John F. Stevens there was organized the so-called Russian Railway Service Corps, composed of American engineers. As originally organized, the personnel of this corps constituted 14 skeleton division units as known in this country, the idea being that these skeleton units would serve as practical advisers and assistants on 14 different sections of the Siberian Railway, and assist the Russians by their knowledge of long-haul problems as known in this country, and which are the rule and not the exceptions in Siberia.

Owing to the Bolshevik uprising, and the general chaotic conditions, neither Mr. Stevens nor the Russian Railway Service Corps was able to begin work in Siberia until March, 1918. They have been able to operate effectively only since the railway plan was adopted in February, 1919.

The most recent report from Mr. Stevens shows that on parts of the Chinese Eastern & Trans-Baikal Railway he is now running six trains a day each way, while only a little while ago they were only able to run that many trains per week.

In accepting the railway plan, it was provided that some protection should be given by the allied forces. Mr. Stevens stated frankly that he would not undertake the arduous task before him unless he could rely upon support from American troops in an emergency. Accordingly, as provided in the railway plan, and with the approval of the interallied committee, the military commanders in Siberia have established troops where it is necessary to maintain order at different parts of the line. The American forces under Gen. Graves are understood to he protecting parts of the line near Vladivostok, and also on the section around Verchne Udinsk. There is also under-stood to be a small body of American troops at Harbin. The exact location from time to time of American troops is, however, subject to change by the direction of Gen. Graves.

The instruction to Gen. Graves directed him not to interfere in Russian affairs but to support Mr. Stevens wherever necessary: The Siberian Railway is not only the main artery for transportation in Siberia but is the only open access to European Russia to-day. The population of Siberia, whose resources have been almost exhausted by the long years of war and the chaotic conditions which have existed there, can be protected from a further period of chaos and anarchy only by the restoration and maintenance of traffic on the Siberian Railway.

Partisan bands under leaders having no settled connection with any organized government, and bands under leaders whose allegiance to any settled authority is apparently temporary and transitory, are constantly menacing the operation of the railway and the safety of its permanent structures.

The situation of the people of Siberia meantime is that they have no shoes or warm clothing; they are pleading for agricultural machinery and for many of the simpler articles of commerce upon which their own domestic economy depends and which are necessary to fruitful and productive industry among them. Having contributed their quota to the Russian armies which fought the central empires for three and one-half years, they now look to the Allies and the United States for economic assistance.

The population of western Siberia and the forces of Admiral Kolchak are entirely dependent upon these railways.

The Russian authorities in this country have succeeded in shipping large quantities of Russian supplies to Siberia, and the Secretary of War is now contracting with the great cooperative societies which operate throughout European and Asiatic Russia to ship further supplies to meet the needs of the civilian population. The Kolchak Government is also endeavoring to arrange for the purchase of medical and other Red Cross supplies from the War department, and the American Red Cross is itself attempting the forms of relief ~or which it is organized. All elements of the population in Siberia look to the United States for assistance. This assistance can not be given to the population of Siberia, and ultimately to Russia, if the purpose entertained for two years to restore railway traffic is abandoned. The presence of American troops is a vital element in this effort. The services of Mr. Stevens depend upon it, and, a’ point of serious moment, the plan proposed by Japan expressly provides that Mr. Stevens and all foreign railway experts shall be withdrawn when the troops are withdrawn.

From these observations it will be. Seen that the purpose of the continuance of American troops in Siberia is that we, with the concurrence of the great allied powers, may keep open a necessary artery of trade and extend to the vast population of Siberia the economic aid essential to it in peace time, but indispensable under the conditions which have followed the prolonged and exhausting participation .by Russia in the war against the Central Powers. This participation was obviously of incalculable value to the allied cause, and in a very particular way commends the exhausted people who suffered from it to such assistance as we can render to bring about their industrial and economic rehabilitation.

 

Very respectfully, yours, Woodrow Wilson